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INTRODUCTION
The federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)1 seems
to be a source of perpetual controversy. Perhaps this is because it
was enacted in reaction to a previous controversy: the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which changed
the legal landscape of religious claims.2 The Court’s subsequent
decision in City of Boerne v. Flores did nothing to quell controversy,
declaring RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states,3 and
ignited debates by religious adherents about the need for state
RFRAs across the country.4 Later, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, RFRA’s weakened status got a boost
from the Court, which gave greater life to the specificity

1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
2. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990) (dispelling the strict scrutiny test
for religious burdens imposed by a “neutral law of general applicability”), superseded by
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488,
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1).
3. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4. After City of Boerne, twenty-one different states enacted state-level versions of
RFRA. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.
Other
states continue to pursue state-level versions of RFRA. 2015 State Religious Freedom
Restoration Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-rfra-legislation.aspx;
2016
State Religious Freedom Restoration Act Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2016-state
-religious-freedom-restoration-act-legislation.aspx; 2017 State Religious Freedom Restoration
Act Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2017-religious-freedom-restoration-act-legislation.aspx.
Professors Terri R. Day and Danielle Weatherby describe the nature of these “mini RFRAs”:
Many of the mini RFRA mimic the federal RFRAs by reinstating strict
scrutiny review for challenges to government regulations that are alleged to
substantially burden religious exercise. But other state RFRAs have key provisions
that extend far beyond their federal parent. For example, some significantly dilute
the substantial burden requirement (requiring only that the challenged law
“burdens” or “restricts” religious exercise). Some envision the practice of religion
to extend to any act or inaction that is tangentially related to a person’s religious
beliefs. And some even add a “clear and convincing” evidence requirement to
satisfy strict scrutiny, making the government’s burden of justifying the
challenged law even more onerous.
Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return to Separate but
Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 919–20 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
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requirement of RFRA’s “to the person” language.5 More recently,
controversy swirled around RFRA’s application to the
contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, especially as the
Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.6 Scholars have
criticized the Hobby Lobby decision as interpreting RFRA too
broadly,7 an interpretation which will inevitably allow religious
adherents to “impose their religious view of morally correct
behavior on others[,]”8 “give license to discriminate[,]”9 benefit
from “an unfair special privilege to ignore the laws everyone else
must obey[,]”10 and turn the U.S. Code into “Swiss cheese” through
exemptions.11 On the other hand, scholars have argued that RFRA,
in practice, is actually under-protecting religious adherents12 and
that a flood13 of discriminatory RFRA claims simply has not
5. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430–31 (2006).
6. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
7. Andrew Koppelman & Frederick M. Gedicks, Is Hobby Lobby Worse for Religious
Liberty than Smith?, 9 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 229 (2015) (asserting Hobby Lobby
“converted RFRA from the statutory restoration of an even-handed balancing test into a
doctrinal revolution that has vested in federal judges the authority to craft a wholly new and
demanding religious exemption jurisprudence”); David B. Schwartz, The NLRA’s Religious
Exemption in a Post-Hobby Lobby World: Current Status, Future Difficulties, and a Proposed
Solution, 30 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 235 (2015) (“Hobby Lobby completes the
transformation of the RFRA into a quasi-constitutional alternative to the Free Exercise
Clause’s traditional jurisprudence.”).
8. Day & Weatherby, supra note 4, at 942.
9. Id.
10. Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied
Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1597 (2018).
11. Aram A. Schvey, Much Ado About Nothing? Religious Freedom and the ContraceptiveCoverage Benefit, 39 HUM. RTS. 11, 12 (2013).
12. Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical
Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353, 353 (2018). Professor Ira
C. Lupu explains lower courts may have a reticence to apply RFRA in full force because
“[b]ehind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to
each judge, and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from
religious deviants of every stripe.” Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on
the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) [hereinafter Where Rights Begin].
As evidence of this reticence, Lupu argues that lower courts’ interpretation of RFRA has not
changed, even after the prodding in O Centro. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious
Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 72 (2015) [hereinafter
Dubious Enterprise].
13. The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby criticized the minority’s predicted “flood of
religious objections.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 732–33 (2014); see
also Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 10, at 1606–07; Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is
Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual
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emerged.14 Much of this controversy, past and present, stems from
inconsistent application of RFRA’s statutory language and the
Supreme Court’s precedent. It is as if lower courts lost RFRA’s
blueprint for success: the plain language of the statute.
The Supreme Court’s decision in O Centro attempted to put
some of RFRA’s inconsistent application to rest, admonishing
courts that RFRA’s “to the person” language requires the
government to focus its compelling interest to “the particular
claimant.”15 Although some have argued that O Centro did little to
advance the RFRA cause,16 this Article suggests just the opposite.
Indeed, this Article’s analysis of post–O Centro cases that discuss
RFRA’s “to the person” language shows that courts are finally
focusing on the particular claimant and, thus, returning to RFRA’s
plain language. This claimant-specific focus has manifested in
courts’ evaluations of compelling government interests, as in O
Centro, and has also spurred “to the person” focus on RFRA’s least
restrictive means requirement. Ultimately, this Article argues that
a strict application of the “to the person” language to both RFRA’s
compelling interest and least restrictive means requirements will
achieve a long-awaited, sustainable religious exemption regime by
awarding the most narrow exemptions to sincerely burdened
religious adherents, thereby allowing the otherwise important
purposes of generally applicable statutes to proceed while
meaningfully vindicating the religious liberties of minority groups.
In advancing this thesis, this Article takes the normative
position that RFRA’s standard is better suited to achieve American
pluralism than the standard set forth in Smith. RFRA relieves
governmental burdens upon the free exercise of sincere religious
adherents, even where the burden is a completely incidental result
of government action—Smith does not. RFRA reflects the American
commitment to pluralism and inclusion by granting relief to the
smallest quantity of sincere religious adherents—usually
Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 487 (2015) (arguing Hobby Lobby “open[ed] up the
floodgates to a host of new potential claims for religious exemption by a host of different
kinds of service providers”); Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 353, 355–56, 383–84, 401.
14. Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 355–56.
15. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430–31 (2006).
16. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12.
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possessing minority views that get little attention in Congress—
while respecting majoritarian initiatives advanced by that body
and the executive. However, it should be noted that RFRA is not a
cure-all approach to every issue of religious freedom.17 Rather, it
functions as a backdrop, providing religious freedom coverage that
other statutes fail to provide.
Part I of this Article discusses RFRA’s historical background,
touching on legislative history relevant to the “to the person”
standard, and proceeds to view RFRA in eras of potency of judicial
application. Part II analyzes RFRA’s textual blueprint: how the “to
the person” standard fits into the structure of RFRA’s text, takes
stock of judicial decisions discussing the “to the person” standard,
and asserts that the post–O Centro “to the person” trend is the most
principled path toward a sustainable and less controversial RFRA
jurisprudence. Part III considers how religious claimants,
government bodies, and judges should act in order to gain from
strict application of the “to the person” standard.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
RFRA’s history is a unique example of how Congress and the
Supreme Court have interacted in the area of constitutional law.
Both bodies interpreted the actions of the other as an overreach of
authority. The current state of RFRA is the product of the reactions
to that perceived overreach.
A. Judicial Decisions Prompting Enactment
Before RFRA, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause set forth an exemption
scheme deferential to bona fide religious adherents.18 This scheme
was characterized by the Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner, a

17. See, e.g., infra note 121 for discussion.
18. Additionally, as Dana Schwartzenfeld states, for “many years, the First

Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause was ‘largely uncontroversial’” with major debates
revolving “around government support for religion . . . rather than government interference
with it.” Dana Anne Schwartzenfeld, Note, Let My People Grow: Putting a Number on Strict
Scrutiny in the Wake of Holt v. Hobbs, 51 GA. L. REV. 297, 301 (2016) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1109, 1109 (1990)).
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case from 1963 which set out the exemption standard.19 David
Schwartz, senior counsel to the National Labor Relations Board,
summarized a court’s process under that standard in two steps by
considering first, “whether the plaintiff demonstrated that the law
imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of religion”20 and
second, “whether there is a ‘compelling state interest’ that
outweighs ‘the degree of impairment of free exercise rights.’”21 In
that process, Schwartz stated, “the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard
requires that any governmental restrictions on fundamental rights
be the ‘least restrictive alternative’ and ‘narrowly tailored’ to
achieve the compelling interest. In addition, while the government
cannot question the validity of an objector’s religious beliefs, it can
question an objector’s sincerity in seeking an exemption.”22
However, the Court became “increasingly resistant to
accommodation claims”23 under the Sherbert standard, leading up
to its decision in Employment Division v. Smith in 1990.
Smith changed the legal landscape of the Free Exercise Clause
by erecting a new standard for religious accommodation and
exemption claims. Under the Smith standard, burdening a religious
adherent’s exercise of religion is justified as long as the burden
results from a “neutral law of general applicability.”24 As such, the
Smith standard substantially decreased the likelihood of obtaining
a free exercise accommodation for religious adherents. Merely
having a burden upon free exercise was not enough. “Religious
groups, Congress, and even secular civil liberties groups strongly
opposed”25 the Court’s decision in Smith.26 The byproduct of
this opposition was Congress’s passage of RFRA,27 a
19.
20.
21.
22.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 230.
Id. (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 406).
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755 (1996).
23. Charlotte Garden, Religious Employers and Labor Law: Bargaining in Good Faith?, 96
B.U. L. REV. 109, 124 (2016).
24. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
25. Alisa Lalana, Note, RFRA and the Affordable Care Act: Does the Contraception Mandate
Discriminate Against Religious Employers?, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 661, 666 (2016).
26. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 10, at 1602–04.
27. Scott W. Gaylord, RFRA Rights Revisited: Substantial Burdens, Judicial Competence,
and the Religious Nonprofit Cases, 81 MO. L. REV. 655, 658 (2016).
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concerted legislative effort to “solidify Sherbert’s substantialburden/compelling-interest standard as a statutory right.”28 But
the text of RFRA went further than simply restoring the Sherbert
test, instead providing even “greater protection for religious
exercise than is available under the First Amendment.”29 However,
this legislative advance “came up against some resistance as to its
application to the states[,]”30 as is discussed below in section I.C.
B. Legislative History
The earliest form of RFRA proposed to Congress, heard first in
the House of Representatives in 1990, focused its Sherbert-like test
to a particular religious adherent, as opposed to an entire religious
group or society at large.31 Indeed, it allowed the government to
restrict free exercise only where “the governmental authority
demonstrate[d] that application of the restriction to the person—(A)
[was] essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”32 The bill heard months later in the Senate
was phrased similarly, allowing free exercise restrictions only
where “the government demonstrate[d] that application of the
restriction to the person”; the bill tracked the rest of the provision
introduced in the House.33 The next year, a new House bill slightly
modified the phrase to become, “Government may burden a
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person[,]”34 a modification that was maintained
in the Senate’s bill a year later.35 The House’s final consideration of
RFRA36 resulted in the addition of a word into the relevant phrase,
leaving it, “Government may substantially burden a person’s
28. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 231.
29. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015); see also Schwartzenfeld, supra note 18,

at 303 (“Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) in order to
enhance the protections provided by the First Amendment.” (footnote omitted)).
30. Schwartzenfeld, supra note 18, at 304.
31. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. § 2(b)(2) (1990).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. S. 3254, 101st Cong. § 2(b)(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
34. H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. § 3(b) (1991) (emphasis added).
35. S. 2969, 102d Cong. § 3(b) (1992).
36. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. § 3(b) (1993). The Senate also made its final consideration of
RFRA in 1993. S. 578, 103d Cong. § 3(b) (1993).
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exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person.”37 This addition is reflected in the presently
enacted statute.38 Overall, the drafting history shows that RFRA’s
“to the person” language was contemplated from the beginning,
put into RFRA’s blueprint, and then deliberately maintained
throughout the revision processes of the House and Senate.39
Curiously, in reports to the congressional bodies, neither
proponents nor opponents of the legislation debated the “to the
person” language. Rather, the reports show that when discussing
the subsection containing the “to the person” language, legislators
and citizens testifying to Congress mainly explained
the
compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis.40
Otherwise, the “to the person” language was included when
reciting the text of the proposed statute.41 Only occasionally was the
37. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. § 3(b) (1993) (as amended by Senate, Oct. 27, 1993)
(emphasis added).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
39. For a compilation of RFRA’s legislative history documents, see
Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act
of
1993
(P.L.
103-141),
U.S.
DEP’T
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/religious-freedom-restoration-act-1993-pl-103-141
(last updated May 27, 2016).
40. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 10 (1992)
[hereinafter H. Hearings] (statement of Robert Dugan, Jr., Director, Office of Public Affairs,
National Association of Evangelicals) (“Section 3(b) of the bill provides that government may
burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person (1) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. This provision is
nothing more than a paraphrase of the Supreme Court’s own compelling interest test since
discarded. It faithfully reflects the purpose of the bill, which is to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is burdened.”); 139 CONG. REC. 4923
(1993) (“This section codifies the compelling interest test as the Supreme Court had
enunciated it and applied it prior to the Smith decision. The bill permits government to
burden the exercise of religion only if it demonstrates a compelling state interest and that the
burden in question the [sic] least restrictive means of furthering the interest. It permits
persons whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of the Act to assert that
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and to obtain appropriate relief
against a government. Standing to assert such a claim or defense is to be governed by the
general rules of standing under Article III of the Constitution.”); 138 CONG. REC. 18,017–18
(1992) (“This section codifies the compelling interest test as the Supreme Court had
enunciated it and applied it prior to the Smith decision. The bill permits government to
burden the exercise of religion only if it demonstrates a compelling state interest and that the
burden in question is the least restrictive means of furthering the interest.”).
41. H. Hearings, supra note 40, at 19, 273 (1992) (statements of Robert P. Dugan, Jr.,
Director, Office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals and James Bopp, Jr.,
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“to the person” language mentioned substantively outside these
categories.42 Perhaps this lack of discussion on the “to the person”
language was a result of the debate’s preoccupation with RFRA’s
potential clash with existing abortion law.43
Whatever the cause for little mention of the “to the person”
language, RFRA successfully passed through Congress, with the
Senate voting to pass the bill ninety-seven to three.44 President Bill
Clinton signed RFRA into law on November 16, 1993.45
C. Pre–City of Boerne46
RFRA remained in full force for about three and a half years
until the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.47

General Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.); The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 160, 209 (1992)
[hereinafter S. Hearings] (statements of Coalitions for America and James Bopp, Jr., General
Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 3, 27 (1993).
42. During one of the debates, Henry Hyde, a Congressman from Illinois, discussed
the issue of abortion while including the “to the person” language
Government may burden a person’s exercise of religion only, and the claim is
made my religion requires me to exterminate my unborn child, or, to use
the preferred phrase, terminate the pregnancy, only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person is essential to further a compelling
governmental interest.
H. Hearings, supra note 40, at 50 (statement of Henry Hyde, Rep. from Illinois). Professor
Lupu’s address critiqued the entire framework of RFRA, mentioning the “to the person”
language: “The requirements that the government’s choice of means, as applied to the person
claiming a religious burden, be both ‘essential to’ and the ‘least restrictive means of
furthering’ a compelling interest will be extremely difficult for government to meet.” Id. at
381 (statement of Professor Ira C. Lupu).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8 (1993) (“There has been much debate about this bill’s
relevance to the issue of abortion.”); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (“There has been much
debate about this act’s relevance to the issue of abortion.”); see generally H. Hearings, supra
note 40; S. Hearings, supra note 41.
44. Roll Call Vote 103rd Congress - 1st Session, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate
.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=1&vote
=00331 (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
45. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious
-practices.html.
46. This Article draws upon the same periods of RFRA potency Professor Lupu has
previously defined. See Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 57–67.
47. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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During that time period, RFRA’s potential power was at its zenith,
applying to all law in the United States, state or federal.48 This
period generated a fairly significant amount of litigation: 168
decisions, predominantly rendered in federal courts.49 However,
even during RFRA’s season of peak strength, religious adherents
prevailed in only fifteen percent of cases heard on their merits,
with thirty-six percent of those wins attributed to prisoners whose
cases “typically involved the most basic infringements of
religious liberty.”50
During this period, local zoning authorities in the city of
Boerne, Texas, denied a request from the Catholic Archbishop of
San Antonio to enlarge St. Peter Catholic Church to accommodate
its growing congregation.51 After the Archbishop challenged the
denial as a violation of RFRA,52 the resulting case, City of Boerne v.
Flores, found its way to the Supreme Court, where the Court held
that Congress exceeded the bounds of its power under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by applying
RFRA to the states.53 The Court’s decision stripped RFRA of much
of its reach, limiting its application to the federal government.54

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 58.
Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 591 (1998).
Id.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
Id.
Id. at 536.
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘government’ includes a branch,
department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law)
of the United States, or of a covered entity.”). On October 6, 2017, the United States Attorney
General issued a memorandum with guidance for the executive branch’s compliance with
religious liberty duties. The memorandum clarifies that all federal actors must be compliant,
not just high-level officials, noting that “[i]n particular, agencies should remember that RFRA
applies to agency enforcement just as it applies to every other governmental action” and
provides guidance specific to agencies as employers, as rule makers, as enforcers, as
contractors, and as grant distributors. Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, 82 Fed.
Reg. 49670–71 (Oct. 26, 2017).
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D. Post–City of Boerne and Pre–O Centro
City of Boerne spurred legislative action in both Congress55 and
state legislatures56 that aimed to accomplish the same or similar
task of RFRA in the state context. While some of those measures
were successful, this period may be regarded as RFRA’s darkest
days, stretching from 1997 to 2006. Professor Ira C. Lupu calls
RFRA during this period “persistently weak”; argues that it
indicated a “gaping chasm between RFRA’s promise, as reflected
in its stringent statutory formula, and RFRA’s performance”; and
notes that in all RFRA cases in the federal courts of appeal, religious
adherents never once prevailed.57 These cases were characterized
by court resolution on the substantial burden and compelling
government interest portions of RFRA’s test.58 In many ways,
during this period, RFRA appeared to be “all but dead”59 language
in the federal code, a forgotten failure of religious liberty
protection. But new life was just around the corner.
E. Post–O Centro to the Present
Hoasca tea was the remedy for RFRA’s comatose state. Indeed,
Hoasca, a sacramental tea brewed from plants unique to the
Brazilian Amazon60 prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act,
was the center of Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal,61 the case that gave RFRA new life. There, the Supreme
Court gave special, even surprising, weight to RFRA’s “to the
55. Two bills were considered in the House of Representatives, advocating for a
“Religious Liberty Protection Act.” H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (as referred to S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, July 16, 1999); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998). However, neither was successful. But
a bill providing a much narrower set of protections was: the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). Many RLUIPA cases
incorporate RFRA’s “to the person” standard.
56. All but two of the states to enact a state RFRA, Kentucky and Pennsylvania,
maintained the “to the person” language in their own statutes. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350
(LexisNexis Supp. 2017); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (West 2012); State
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 4.
57. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 60–61.
58. Id. at 61 n.118.
59. Lupu, supra note 49, at 575.
60. Hoasca Tea, CENTRO ESPÍRITA BENEFICENTE UNIÃO DO VEGETAL U.S.,
http://udvusa.org/hoasca-tea/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
61. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
423 (2006).
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person” language, requiring the government to focus its analysis
on a small group of religious adherents belonging to the “Centro
Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal” (UDV) who drank hoasca
tea as an essential part of their faith.62 Specifically, the Court
rejected what the government had asserted as a compelling
governmental interest—uniform enforcement of the Controlled
Substances Act—terming it a “categorical approach” with “broadly
formulated interests” and “general characteristics.”63 The Court
continued, explaining, “RFRA requires the Government to
demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through
application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened.”64 Thus, the Court examined the government’s interest
under “the more focused inquiry required by RFRA,” which,
through the “to the person” standard, required the government to
“consider[] the harms posed by the particular use at issue [in O
Centro]—the circumscribed, sacramental use of hoasca by the
UDV”65 and its 130 members.66 Although the Court noted that
RFRA does not foreclose the ability of the government to
“demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a
particular program by offering evidence that granting the
requested religious accommodations would seriously compromise
its ability to administer the program[,]”67 it held that the
government could not show the UDV’s use of hoasca seriously
compromised its ability to administer the Controlled Substances
Act.68 Notably, the Court did not apply the “to the person”
language to the least restrictive means prong of RFRA, deciding the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 430–33.
Id. at 430–32.
Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 425. Since 2006, UDV’s membership has grown to 270 individuals. People of
the União, CENTRO ESPÍRITA BENEFICENTE UNIÃO DO VEGETAL U.S., http://udvusa.org
/people-of-the-uniao/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
67. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 435.
68. Id. at 432 (“Congress’ determination that [hoasca] should be listed under Schedule
I simply does not provide a categorical answer that relieves the Government of the obligation
to shoulder its burden under RFRA.”); id. at 439 (“[W]e conclude that the courts below did
not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary
injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca.”).
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case solely on the failure of the government to show a focused
compelling interest.
O Centro has been termed a “surprisingly strong interpretation
of RFRA,”69 not because the Supreme Court was giving RFRA new
strength from outside the statute, but because the interpretation in
O Centro returned to the plain meaning of the “to the person”
language already contained in RFRA’s blueprint, suggesting “the
possibility that RFRA’s original promise might actually be
realized.”70 The strength of O Centro’s interpretation is underscored
by the fact that it was a unanimous opinion—not even the justices
typically hostile to religion claims voiced dissent.71
After the Court’s admonition to interpret the “to the person”
language at a high level of specificity, many courts started
enforcing other sections of RFRA’s test with more force to cut down
RFRA claims and dodge the “to the person” analysis altogether.72
But the courts that have taken the “to the person” language head
on seem to have taken O Centro seriously.
II. JUDICIAL USE OF THE “TO THE PERSON” STANDARD
In order to measure whether courts are more faithfully
adhering to focused analysis of RFRA’s “to the person” language
after O Centro, this Article turns to empirical data. But, first, this
Article looks to a plain language reading of RFRA’s “to the person”
text, outlining what should be courts’ primary consideration when
engaging in statutory interpretation.
A. Textual Interpretation of “To the Person”
The structure of RFRA’s text and where the “to the person”
language falls within it provides the best, and most obvious,

69. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 62.
70. Id.
71. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 422 (“Roberts, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which

all other Members joined, except Alito, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.”).
72. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 63. This sort of interpretive move, often made
on RFRA’s requirement that the religious adherent’s religious exercise be substantially
burdened, could have been employed by courts from the advent of RFRA. Indeed, the
substantial burden requirement remains a threshold for RFRA claims that lower courts
arguably continue to expand and contract.
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structural clue about how the “to the person” language should be
interpreted. RFRA’s text appears as follows:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense
under this section shall be governed by the general rules of
standing under article III of the Constitution.73

Under inspection in this Article is subsection (b). However, as
discussed below, subsection (a), requiring a religious adherent to
make a showing that a government action substantially burdens the
religious adherent’s exercise of religion, operates as an effective
gatekeeper in the courts, screening out both insincere claimants and
sincere claimants who are not truly burdened.74

73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (emphasis added).
74. See Gaylord, supra note 27, at 691 (explaining “the substantiality of a burden is

determined by the level of force the government applies to get a religious believer to
contravene his religious beliefs, not a court’s independent determination that a law’s
requirements are or are not actually consistent with his professed religious beliefs” and
discussing substantial burden analysis in the context of religious nonprofit organizations);
see also Lupu, supra note 49, at 594 (noting that “judges seeking to limit exemptions will be
inclined to rely upon the ‘burden’ requirement as the primary obstacle to RFRA claimants”
and that “[j]udges have used a variety of interpretive moves to disqualify RFRA claims on
the grounds of insufficient burden on religion”).
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It is easy to see that the “to the person” language within
subsection (b) is placed previous to, and separate from, subsections
(b)(1) and (b)(2) below it. Thus, visually, it sits above the compelling
interest and least restrictive means tests. This placement, together
with the punctuation of the subsection’s sentence, indicates that the
“to the person” language is (1) a court’s first concern under the
subsection, and (2) that the language applies to both the compelling
interest and least restrictive means tests. In other words, RFRA’s
subsection (b) really entails three steps: (1) recognition of the
religious plaintiff as the “particular claimant”75 at issue, (2)
evidence that the government has a compelling interest specific to
the plaintiff, and (3) evidence that the government’s choice of
furthering that specific compelling interest is the least restrictive
means for that plaintiff. This conclusion, reinforced by O Centro,
provides straightforward guidance for the application of RFRA.
Below, this Article surveys the success of this conclusion in
the courts.
B. Methodology
To track courts’ use of the “to the person” standard after O
Centro, this Article analyzes two data sets: (1) all federal court of
appeals decisions citing RFRA, and (2) all federal decisions,
including district courts, where the “to the person” language was a
significant consideration.76 Although not as robust as some

75. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430–31; see also Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &.
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 590 (6th Cir. 2018) (terming this step “the ‘to
the person’ test”). It should be noted that while this Article often refers to “particular
claimants” as plaintiffs and discusses plaintiff-level specificity, RFRA may also be asserted by
defendants as a defense to government action taken against them. Thus, plaintiff-level
specificity is interchangeable with defendant-level specificity.
76. These data sets were chosen to provide different lenses through which to view
judicial treatment of RFRA, and more specifically, the use of the “to the person” language in
RFRA analysis. The first data set, analyzing federal courts of appeal decisions citing RFRA,
was chosen to provide a picture of high-level appellate decisions more likely to engage in
merits discussions of RFRA than their district court counterparts. This was done in an effort
to gauge the frequency of substantial analyses of the “to the person” language as opposed to
other RFRA-related analyses.
The second data set, analyzing all federal decisions, including district courts, where
the “to the person” language was a significant consideration, was chosen as an issue-specific
examination of how federal courts analyze the “to the person” language of RFRA, as opposed
to how frequently they do so. In an effort to provide as much qualitative data to this issue-
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empirical studies, this Article’s resulting data set was achieved by
modeling empirical analysis.77
The first data set was obtained by viewing Westlaw’s citing
references to RFRA, specifically Section 2000bb-1. The 1,353 results
were narrowed to 815 reported federal decisions. By eliminating
federal district court, bankruptcy court, and specialty court
decisions, 306 cases remained, which, when duplicate results were
removed and only cases occurring after February 21, 2006 (the date
of the O Centro decision) were considered, reduced to 118
decisions.78 These decisions were individually reviewed for their
RFRA treatment.
The second data set was obtained by searching Westlaw’s
federal cases database for: ”‘RFRA’ & ‘to the person’ &
‘compelling’.” The resulting case bank is composed of 696 cases.
These results were further narrowed to 192 cases by excluding
unreported decisions, decisions entered previous to O Centro, and
bankruptcy and specialty court decisions. These 192 cases were
reviewed for a discussion of RFRA’s “to the person” standard that
went beyond a simple recitation of the language from the statute.79
In the end, fifty-nine decisions contained substantive discussions of
the “to the person” language.80
C. Prevalence of “To the Person” Analysis in Federal Appellate Courts
The first data set shows the frequency with which federal
appellate courts reach RFRA’s “to the person” language after O
Centro. Decisions were sorted into four categories: (1) those with a
significant discussion of the “to the person” language, even if

specific examination, district court cases were also included. By including district court cases,
this second data set was also useful as a tool to view the rates of different types of “to the
person” engagement at the district and appellate levels of review.
Overall, federal courts, as opposed to state courts, were chosen for analysis because
RFRA is a federal statute, and therefore a federal question frequently engaged in the federal
court system. An empirical analysis of state courts’ interpretation of RFRA’s “to the person”
standard would also be an interesting and useful data set.
77. Cf. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 10, at 1633–39; Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12,
at 357–62.
78. See infra Appendix A.
79. Where cases were resolved on RFRA’s threshold substantial burden test, but a
court proceeded in the alternative to analyze the “to the person” standard in some depth,
those cases were deemed to include a substantive discussion of the “to the person” language.
80. See infra Appendix B.
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discussed as an alternative holding (TTP); (2) those that referenced
RFRA to lend interpretive power or historical context to a Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim (RLUIPA); (3)
those that dispensed with a RFRA claim on non-to-the-person
considerations, like standing, jurisdiction, or RFRA’s relationship
with sovereign immunity and money damages, or involved a state
RFRA (Non-TTP); and (4) those that were resolved on the
substantial burden prong of RFRA (Sub. Burden). Several cases
included discussions falling into more than one category. Table 1
depicts this categorization.
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This data reveals some interesting findings. It suggests that
RFRA cases, even at the appellate level, are being considered at all
stages of the RFRA test in the post–O Centro era; they are not all
being shut out on RFRA’s substantial burden threshold.
First, just under half of all RFRA claims are resolved without
touching on either of RFRA’s prongs—by definitional, justiciability,
or applicability analysis. In other words, these claims fail before
reaching RFRA’s substantial burden threshold. Second, fifteen
percent of decisions citing RFRA do not apply it at all—RLUIPA
decisions—which usually reference RFRA in a passing description
of RLUIPA’s genesis or analogize to RFRA’s constitutionally
derived burdens.
Third, roughly a quarter of RFRA decisions are made on the
substantial burden prong of RFRA. Yet, those decisions occur just
as often as decisions made on RFRA’s “to the person” prong, in
conjunction with the compelling interest and least restrictive means
considerations. In the end, the data shows that, at most, only
twenty-eight claims survived in the appellate sphere to be
evaluated in RFRA’s final, “to the person” consideration. And
many of those evaluations denied religious exemptions at the
last step.
D. Judicial Analysis of “To the Person” in All Federal Courts
The second data set provides more qualitative context to federal
judicial treatment of RFRA. Here, decisions, including federal
district court decisions, were sorted into categories according to
their method of employing the “to the person” analysis: (1)
description and/or application of the “to the person” language to
compelling interest analysis (TTP w/ CI Only), and (2) description
and/or application of the “to the person” language to both the
compelling interest and least restrictive means analyses (TTP w/ CI
& LRM). Table 2 depicts this categorization on the right side of the
black line. On the left side of the black line, Table 2 compares
the frequency of “to the person” analysis in federal district courts
(D. Ct. TTP) with federal appellate courts (App. TTP) in the
same jurisdiction.
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As Table 2 shows, federal appellate courts do not reach the “to
the person” language with the same frequency as the federal
district courts below them, although the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits buck that trend. This is not too surprising—many RFRA
cases are resolved at the district court level. But what is most
interesting is that Table 2 shows most federal courts considering the
“to the person” language apply it to both the compelling interest
and least restrictive means portions of RFRA’s second prong. While
the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have lower frequencies of
fully engaging the “to the person” language, the First, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court, have fully
engaged the “to the person” language every time those courts reach
that step of RFRA’s test. Overall, the “to the person” analysis has
been applied to both the compelling interest and least restrictive
means considerations at a rate of sixty-eight percent.
This last finding is of particular interest because O Centro itself
only explicitly reinforced the “to the person” language’s plaintifflevel specificity as to the compelling interest consideration.81 In
other words, if O Centro were the sole driving force behind plaintifflevel specificity, one would expect the TTP w/ CI Only percentage
to be much higher. However, some courts have drawn from Free
Exercise Clause interpretation to particularize RFRA’s least
restrictive means requirement in a similar, plaintiff-specific way.
As an example, in Legatus v. Sebelius,82 a federal district court in
Michigan used a plaintiff-specific definition of least restrictive
means from South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Commission of
Ohio,83 a free exercise and establishment case. The quoted definition
from South Ridge Baptist Church explained the least restrictive
means to be “the extent to which accommodation of the [plaintiff]
would impede the state’s objectives.”84 After using this definition,
the district court proceeded to evaluate the least restrictive means
as “to the person” of Legatus—not just the least restrictive means

81. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439
(2006) (declining to address the State’s least restrictive means argument for failure to show
particularized compelling interest).
82. Legatus v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 794, 810–13 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
83. S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm’n, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1990).
84. Legatus, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 810 (quoting S. Ridge Baptist Church, 911 F.2d at 1206).
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of accomplishing the government’s compelling interest as to
Roman Catholics or the general body of Americans.85
Other courts have created plaintiff-level specificity by
collapsing subsection (b)’s two requirements to consider whether
“application of the burden to the person . . . is the least restrictive
means of furthering [a] compelling government interest.”86 Perhaps
this is because, for some courts, the “distinction between the two
[considerations] is not always clear.”87
However, a much simpler, O Centro–type move to create
plaintiff-level specificity is found in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hobby Lobby. There, the Court, in its explanation of least
restrictive means, emphasized RFRA’s “to the person” language:
“See §§ 2000bb–1(a), (b) (requiring the Government to
‘demonstrat[e] that application of [a substantial] burden to the
person . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling
governmental interest’ (emphasis added)).”88 By doing this, the
Court emphasized what should have been obvious from RFRA’s
text: the “to the person” language applies in equal and separate
measure to the least restrictive means analysis.89 The surrounding
text makes the Court’s plaintiff-level emphasis for the least
restrictive means requirement the most clear. The Court stated,
“HHS has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving its
desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise
of religion by the objecting parties in these cases.”90 This passage
has had the largest effect in creating plaintiff-level specificity on the
least restrictive means consideration. Indeed, various cases cite
Hobby Lobby for this proposition.91 In many ways, Hobby Lobby
85. Id. at 810–13.
86. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 691 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)); see also La. Coll. v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 766, 786 (W.D. La.
2014); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1063 (D. Colo. 2014).
87. N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1188–89 (D. Wyo. 2015).
88. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014).
89. Other courts have followed a similar approach, simply emphasizing the obvious
language of RFRA. See United States v. Anderson, 854 F.3d 1033, 1036–37 (8th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1063 (9th Cir. 2016); Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841 (E.D.
Mich. 2016).
90. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 728.
91. See, e.g., Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1158 (11th Cir. 2016); Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201,
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has done for least restrictive means what O Centro did for
compelling interest.
Whatever the method for adopting this plaintiff-specific
approach, what O Centro left unfinished—the reemphasis of the “to
the person” language’s application to the least restrictive means
test—is now being completed.
E. O Centro’s Success: Diminishing the “Swiss Cheese” Problem
Even though RFRA’s textual blueprint plainly shows that the
“to the person” specificity requirement applies to both the
compelling interest and least restrictive means portions of RFRA,
full judicial application of the “to the person” standard is a recent
event. It looks like RFRA’s original promise might finally be
realized.92 Some, however, feel this original promise is a threat to
the ordered administration of justice, undermining generally
applicable laws,93 allowing religious adherents to become a law
unto themselves,94 and creating a metaphorical “Swiss cheese”
legal system with gaping holes created by exemptions.95 This fear
is overstated. While RFRA does in fact grant religious adherents
exemptions, its statutory burdens ensure these exemptions do not
thwart the purpose behind generally applicable laws. Indeed, the
strengthening of RFRA’s “to the person” language—through O
Centro, Hobby Lobby, and other cases—only makes RFRA’s
exemption framework more sustainable.

230 (D.D.C. 2016); Armstrong v. Jewell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 242, 249 (D.R.I. 2015); March for Life
v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 131 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); United States v. Epstein, 91 F.
Supp. 3d 573, 586 (D.N.J. 2015).
92. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 62.
93. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 739–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (“[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory
religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is
constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned
by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of
all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”).
95. Schvey, supra note 11, at 12.
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But how can this be? Does not the strengthening of the “to the
person” language only work to the benefit of religious adherents?
The answer to these questions, of course, is in the cases.
First, recent studies have shown that exemptions resulting from
RFRA are not punching holes in legislative frameworks at an
alarming rate. In Professor Goodrich and Ms. Busick’s analysis of
Tenth Circuit religious freedom cases, they observed that the
number of RFRA claims was quite small—only thirty-one in ten
years.96 And these cases appear to be mostly confined to narrow
scenarios: challenges of the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive
mandate, Native American religious practices, and drug schemes.97
Only forty-eight percent of those cases resulted in an exemption, all
a product of the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate,98
which Goodrich and Busick argue is an anomalous source of RFRA
cases anyway.99 Without the anomalous contraceptive mandate
cases, RFRA, in the Tenth Circuit, left legislative schemes
untouched.100 Thus, while RFRA’s framework allows, in theory, for
the granting of various religious exemptions from generally
applicable laws, in practice, very few are granted.
Second, the exemptions that are granted by RFRA are carefully
narrowed by RFRA’s statutory burdens: the substantial burden test
and, of particular interest here, the “to the person” standard’s
application to both the compelling interest and least restrictive
means requirements. In other words, RFRA makes sure that any
holes that are created in the “Swiss cheese” are small101 and do not

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 363–66.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 382. Goodrich and Busick argue that although the Tenth Circuit is not
perfectly representative of all federal courts across the nation, it is uniquely situated to be
predictive of the future of religious liberty litigation because (1) it was the pipeline for some
of the most influential religious liberty decisions in recent years, such as Hobby Lobby and
Little Sisters of the Poor, (2) the balance of its Republican- and Democrat-appointed judges
hovers near fifty-fifty, (3) its reversal rate falls near the federal circuit average, and (4) the
religious demographic of the Tenth Circuit is almost exactly the same as the nation as a
whole. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 356.
101. Interestingly, the United States Department of Agriculture has actually regulated
the size of holes in Swiss cheese, taking the “eyes” in the cheese from the size of a nickel to
the size of a dime. Bob Faw & John Seigenthaler, The Hole Story: USDA Regulates Size of Holes
in Swiss Cheese, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2000), https://archives.nbclearn.com
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impair its flavor—what the law was intended to accomplish.102 The
substantial burden test ensures that disingenuous and insubstantial
RFRA claims never result in an exemption. The “to the person”
language shrinks the possible exemption to an identifiable
individual or group of individuals. Applied to the compelling
interest test, the “to the person” standard requires the government
to explore the diameter of such a narrow exemption. The
government must show it has a compelling interest in closing the
pinpoint sized hole created by an individual or group’s
noncompliance. And if the government has a plaintiff-specific
compelling interest, the “to the person” language, working in
tandem with the least restrictive means requirement, requires the
government to show that closing the hole is the only way to
maintain the flavor of the legislative cheese. RFRA assures religious
exemptions do not consume generally applicable laws; it keeps our
cheese flavorful.
After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, many
have argued that the Court’s interpretation of the word “person”
as used in RFRA to cover closely-held, for-profit corporations103
will expand holes in the Swiss cheese, creating large exemptions for
vast numbers of people.104 Hobby Lobby, Inc., for example,
employs roughly 37,500 employees.105 Hobby Lobby’s RFRA
exemption thus created a hole in the Affordable Care Act cheese.

/portal/site/k-12/flatview?cuecard=51917; see also Kitchen Daily, Why Does Swiss Cheese
Have Holes?, HUFFPOST (Apr. 17, 2012, 6:04 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/04/17/holes-in-swiss-cheese_n_1428707.html.
102. Professor Garden has addressed RFRA’s narrow exceptions regime in the
employment context. See Garden, supra note 23, at 157 (“[T]he interests of all concerned are
served when accommodations are as narrow as possible, particularly if they burden third
parties. Of course, narrow accommodations minimize encroachments on employees’
interests. But, perhaps counterintuitively, religious employers are also better off when RFRA
accommodations are narrow.”).
103. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014). “Person” has been
deemed to include non-profit corporations as well. Id.
104. See Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, 82 Fed. Reg. 49669 (Oct. 26, 2017)
(interpreting “person” to apply to individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies); Rachel Alexander, The Constitutional
Theory of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 175 L. & JUST. 209, 212 (2015); Dubious Enterprise, supra
note 12, at 78–80; Garden, supra note 23, at 139–40; Koppelman & Gedicks, supra note 7,
at 224.
105. Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, https://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
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But even that hole is tiny, amounting to only 0.002% of the
American workforce.106 To say that expansion of “person” to cover
corporate entities with religious identity will allow RFRA to hollow
out legislation is an overstatement.107
This conclusion is emphasized by the far more typical type of
prevailing RFRA litigant: individuals or small religious
organizations. Take, for example, Robert Soto, a Native American
pastor, and his congregation;108 Kawal Tagore, a Sikh employee of
the IRS ousted from her job;109 or the Irshad Learning Center, a
Muslim community group.110
Often enough, however, RFRA is applied to preclude any
exemption, however miniscule, in cases where the government
meets its burdens under the “to the person” standard. The
government’s ability to administrate an absolute ban on controlled
substances serves as a good example. In O Centro, as stated above,
the Supreme Court granted an exemption to the Controlled
Substances Act, allowing a small sect to drink hallucinogenic tea.111
In doing so, the Court articulated that its decision should not be
interpreted to mean it would be impossible for the government to
enforce an absolute ban on some controlled substances.112 The
Court stated it was possible that “the Government can demonstrate
a compelling interest in uniform application of a particular
program by offering evidence that granting the requested religious

106. Chuck Vollmer, 2016 State of the U.S. Labor Force, JOBENOMICS (Jan. 12, 2016),
https://jobenomicsblog.com/2016-state-of-the-u-s-labor-force/ (explaining Bureau of
Labor Statistics from 2016 which estimate 157,833,000, or forty-nine percent, of Americans
belong to the “Civilian Labor Force”).
107. See generally Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12.
108. McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014);
Settlement Agreement, McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7:07-cv-060 (S.D. Tex.
June 13, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/Exhibit-1-Settlement-Agreement
-file-stamped.pdf.
109. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013); Order Granting Motion for
Authorization to Enter, Tagore v. United States, No. H-09-0027 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2014),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/Court-Order_Tagore.pdf.
110. Irshad Learning Ctr. v. County of DuPage, 804 F. Supp. 2d 697 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
111. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
439 (2006).
112. Id. at 435.
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accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to
administer the program.”113
The government has managed to make such a demonstration in
several cases. In United States v. Christie,114 the government
successfully showed that plaintiffs’ “unbending compliance” with
the Controlled Substances Act was the least restrictive means of
advancing a compelling government interest: preventing
distribution of cannabis to recreational users.115 There, the Ninth
Circuit explained,
[t]he record in this case succeeds where the record in O Centro
fell short because . . . in this case there is specific evidence that the
[plaintiffs’] distribution methods created a realistic possibility
that cannabis intended for members of the [plaintiffs’ church]
would be distributed instead to outsiders who were merely
feigning membership in the [church] and adherence to its
religious tenets.116

A religious exemption for marijuana use and distribution was
similarly foreclosed by the government’s showing of a
particularized compelling interest and least restrictive means in
Armstrong v. Jewell,117 where the Rhode Island Federal District
Court “acknowledge[d] the overwhelming difference between
marijuana . . . and other substances, which are used by religious
organizations in tightly circumscribed ceremonies.”118 The
government has successfully availed itself of this reasoning in cases
outside of the Controlled Substances Act—for example, complete
bans on the crime of kidnapping,119 the application of uniform
terms of supervision for probationers,120 Title VII’s nondiscrimination requirements,121 and the restriction of inmates’
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1056–57.
Id. at 1057.
Armstrong v. Jewell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 242, 251 (D.R.I. 2015).
Id. at 252.
United States v. Epstein, 91 F. Supp. 3d 573, 583–87 (D.N.J. 2015).
United States v. Lafley, 656 F.3d 936, 940–42 (9th Cir. 2011).
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884
F.3d 560, 595 (6th Cir. 2018). Although this Article is focused on the application of Federal
RFRA, it is important to note that for state RFRAs, one area similar to Title VII that has
resulted in almost no exemptions is where religious adherents invoke a state RFRA in order
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access to alcohol.122 Although these cases involved small groups, or
even individuals, whose resulting religious exemption would have
been a microscopic hole in the relevant legislation, the government
was still able to prevail.
These considerations show that RFRA’s statutory burdens,
when appropriately considered through the lens of the plaintiffspecific “to the person” standard, produce the smallest religious
exemptions possible. RFRA, properly applied, will not gut
legislative frameworks. Rather, it is a statutory method of balancing
important rights in a pluralistic society. It protects religious
claimants from substantial burdens on the free exercise of their
religion through tiny exemptions while permitting the overall
advancement of the government’s stated goals in the enforcement
of otherwise beneficial legislation.

to obtain an exemption from a state non-discrimination law which includes sexual
orientation and/or gender identity as a protected class. Courts have uniformly, with only
one exception, held that non-discrimination is a compelling interest and that there is no less
restrictive means, other than uniform enforcement, to achieve that interest. See, e.g., Dep’t of
Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc., BCV-17-102855 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
Feb. 5, 2018) (exception); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); State
v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017). Thus, political arguments that new state
RFRAs could be used as a “license to discriminate” against the LGBT community are
inconsistent with how courts have treated the issue. See Brett Wilkins, Other States
Considering
Arizona-Inspired
Anti-gay
Bills,
DIGITAL
J.
(Feb.
27,
2014),
http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/politics/other-states-considering-arizona-inspired
-anti-gay-bills/article/373441.
State RFRAs, then, do not appear to be a good solution for the perceived
face-off between religious exercise and non-discrimination. Smaller, more focused
legislative exemptions, such as those enacted in Utah, resolve these questions with greater
confidence, finality, and respect. See S.B. 296, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015); S.B.
297, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015); Dennis Romboy, Utah Anti-bias, Religious
Rights Law Could Be Model for Other States, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 14, 2015,
3:30 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865624241/Utah-anti-bias-religiousrights-law-could-be-model-for-other-states.html; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Summary
of
the
Utah
Compromise
(Mar.
24,
2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2584543. Despite this, federal and state RFRAs serve an
important role in vindicating the free exercise rights of religious minorities because religious
minorities, lacking political power, are unlikely to successfully be able to petition legislatures
to enact smaller, focused legislative exemptions for their religious practice. Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Common Ground Lawmaking: Lessons for Peaceful Coexistence from Masterpiece
Cakeshop and the Utah Compromise, 51 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
122. Sample v. Lappin, 479 F. Supp. 2d 120, 124 (D.D.C. 2007).
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III. MOVING FORWARD IN RFRA LITIGATION
Applying RFRA’s “to the person” standard to both the
compelling interest and least restrictive means analyses should
reduce the perception that RFRA is a tool of controversy, a sword
for Christian oppressors,123 or an unsustainable exemption
regime.124 But to separate RFRA from controversy and produce a
sustainable RFRA jurisprudence, participants in RFRA litigation,
whether they be religious claimants, government defendants, or the
judiciary itself, must fully take the “to the person” language
into account.
A. Religious Claimants
RFRA’s “to the person” language is particularly important for
religious claimants. Although courts’ due diligence should bring
the “to the person” language into consideration in all RFRA cases
that make it past the substantial burden hurdle, plaintiffs should
invoke the “to the person” standard obviously in their pleadings,
in oral argument, in briefs, and in any other stage of litigation.
Shying away from a plaintiff-specific standard allows the
government to successfully argue broadly asserted compelling
interests, which, because of their breadth, portend much greater
harms during litigation than could be possible if the interest were
narrowed to the plaintiff at hand. Similarly, missing the plaintiffspecific mark of RFRA’s least restrictive means analysis permits the
government, in its least restrictive means analysis, to take into
account the harms and benefits to the population at large—not the
individualized burden to a religious plaintiff.
B. Government Defendants
Rather than asserting unparticularized RFRA arguments,
government defendants should recognize RFRA’s plaintiff-level
specificity. In some cases, plaintiff-specific compelling interests
may be difficult to articulate, and plaintiff-specific least restrictive
means may be impossible to show. In those cases, the government
may not win the day. But the government should rest assured that

123. Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 353.
124. Koppelman & Gedicks, supra note 7, at 224.
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the resulting religious exemption will be as narrow and particular
as it can be while respecting free exercise. Of course, the
government will not always lose under RFRA’s “to the person”
specificity. Indeed, the government should follow cases like
Christie, Armstrong, Epstein, and Lafley to success. If the current
administration follows its own guidance, it seems like it will
employ a plaintiff-specific approach to RFRA litigation.125
C. The Judiciary
Analyzing RFRA with “to the person” particularity should be
in judges’ self-interest. If judges are afraid to grant religious
exemptions because “[b]ehind every free exercise claim is a spectral
march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will
be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from
religious deviants of every stripe,”126 then RFRA’s track record
since O Centro shows this fear is unfounded. Additionally, the
reemphasis of the “to the person” language provided by O Centro,
Hobby Lobby, and other decisions should comfort judges—
instructing (not whispering) that exemptions can be granted to
particularized plaintiffs so narrowly that a flood of exemption
claims will not ensue. And even if a flood did ensue, RFRA’s
statutory burdens would shut out the meritless claims.
Moreover, strictly applying RFRA’s “to the person” language
serves another judicial interest: faithfully interpreting statutes by
their plain meaning.127 Not only does this allow courts to avoid
mental gymnastics to kick out a possible exemption, but it also
allows the court to disengage from political controversy—focusing
on the specificity of RFRA’s standard of proof. And judges’
confidence in the end product of RFRA litigation—the narrowest
exemptions possible to otherwise beneficial legislation—should
strengthen courts’ resolve to apply RFRA’s obvious “to the
person” language.
125. Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, 82 Fed. Reg. 49670 (Oct. 26, 2017)
(“[I]nterests must be evaluated not in broad generalities but as applied to the
particular adherent.”).
126. Where Rights Begin, supra note 12, at 947.
127. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“‘In determining the scope of a
statute, we look first to its language,’ giving the ‘words used’ their ‘ordinary meaning.’”
(citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); and then
quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))).
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Thus, judges should demand plaintiff-level “to the person”
specificity when evaluating RFRA claims, both on the compelling
interest and least restrictive means considerations. Doing so will
focus litigation and ensure that RFRA’s original purpose is
achieved, without disrupting the government’s enforcement of
otherwise beneficial legislation. Courts should not forget that
RFRA, like the legislation from which RFRA may grant exemptions,
was also enacted legislatively.
CONCLUSION
Proper application of RFRA’s “to the person” language puts
fear, controversy, and speculation to rest. This language, and its
intended effect, was contemplated from the beginning of RFRA.
After O Centro, Hobby Lobby, and other cases, the “to the person”
standard has finally been applied as RFRA’s textual blueprint so
obviously intended: equally and separately to both the compelling
interest and least restrictive means requirements. This is the basis
for RFRA’s sustainable exemption framework, which promotes
narrow accommodations in the interests of all concerned. These
narrow exemptions simply have not swallowed legislative regimes.
Rather, RFRA permits religious adherents to live according to their
faith while allowing Congress’s interests to advance. To sustain
RFRA’s balance, religious claimants, government defendants, and
the judiciary must all play their part. Only then may RFRA be
decoupled from controversy.
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APPENDIX A
Federal Appellate Decisions Citing RFRA After O Centro
Last updated June 13, 2018
Case Name

Category

Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2006)
Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d
1022 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d
1036 (7th Cir. 2006)
Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cty. of
Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006)
Vill. of Bensenville v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 457
F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir.
2006)
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d
1024 (9th Cir. 2007)
Spratt v. Rhode Island Dep’t Of Corr., 482 F.3d
33 (1st Cir. 2007)
San Juan Cty., Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d
1163 (10th Cir. 2007)
Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2007)
Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007)
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007)
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of
Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007)
United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851 (9th
Cir. 2007)
Fernandez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 553 (9th Cir.
2008)
Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
Greene v. Solano Cty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th
Cir. 2008)
Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807
(8th Cir. 2008)
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir.
2008)
Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965 (9th Cir.
2008)

RLUIPA
Non-TTP
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United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 522 F.3d 914
(9th Cir. 2008)
Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008)
Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2008)
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.
2008)
United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2008)
Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir.
2008)
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d
1058 (9th Cir. 2008)
Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008)
Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231
(3d Cir. 2008)
Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2008)
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 F.3d
1207 (9th Cir. 2008)
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. F.A.A., 550
F.3d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir.
2008)
Carroll Coll., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 558 F.3d 568
(D.C. Cir. 2009)
Potter v. D.C., 558 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2009)
Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169
(3d Cir. 2009)
S. Fork Band Council Of W. Shoshone Of Nevada
v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir.
2009)
Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010)
A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch.
Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010)
Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 508
(D.C. Cir. 2010)
Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day
Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir.
2010)

TTP
RLUIPA
Non-TTP
Substantial Burden,
TTP
TTP
RLUIPA
Substantial Burden
RLUIPA
Non-TTP
Non-TTP
Substantial Burden
Non-TTP
TTP
Non-TTP
TTP
Non-TTP
RLUIPA, Non-TTP
Non-TTP
Non-TTP
Non-TTP
Non-TTP
Non-TTP
Non-TTP
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United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th
Cir. 2011)
Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975 (8th Cir.
2011)
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011)
Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
United States v. Lafley, 656 F.3d 936 (9th Cir.
2011)
Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir.
2012)
Walden v. Centers for Disease Control &
Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012)
Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Hawaii, Inc. v.
Holder, 676 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2012)
Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 2012)
United States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 705 (8th Cir.
2012)
Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs,
Miss., 697 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2012)
Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483 (9th
Cir. 2012)
Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C.
Cir. 2012)
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S.
1401 (2012)
Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2013)
Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2013)
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d
1114 (10th Cir. 2013)
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir.
2013)
Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of
Springfield, 724 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2013)
Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.
2013)
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d
377 (3d Cir. 2013)
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th
Cir. 2013)
Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 (6th
Cir. 2013)
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Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013)
Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir.
2013)
In re McGough, 737 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2013)
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir.
2014)
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547
(7th Cir. 2014)
Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105 (2d Cir.
2014)
Michigan Catholic Conference & Catholic Family
Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014)
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014)
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 756 F.3d
1339 (11th Cir. 2014)
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014)
Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793 (7th Cir.
2014)
Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554 (6th Cir.
2014)
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764
F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014)
O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 766 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2014)
Annex Med., Inc. v. Burwell, 769 F.3d 578 (8th
Cir. 2014)
Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir.
2015)
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015)
Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015)
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015)
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606
(7th Cir. 2015)
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Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 808 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792 (7th Cir.
2015)
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged,
Denver, Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th
Cir. 2015)
Wieland v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 793 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2015)
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th
Cir. 2015)
Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934 (11th Cir.
2015)
Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d
207 (2d Cir. 2015)
Grace Sch. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788 (7th Cir.
2015)
Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015)
Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir.
2015)
E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 630
(5th Cir. 2015)
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.3d
1122 (11th Cir. 2016)
Oklevueha Native Am. Church Of Hawaii, Inc. v.
Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016)
United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th
Cir. 2016)
Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d
Cir. 2016)
United States v. Comrie, 842 F.3d 348 (5th Cir.
2016)
United States v. Anderson, 854 F.3d 1033 (8th
Cir. 2017)
Ghailani v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir.
2017)
United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.
2017)
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017)
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Islamic Ctr. of Nashville v. Tennessee, 872 F.3d
377 (6th Cir. 2017)
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital
Park & Planning Comm’n, No. 15-2597, 2018
WL 2400763 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 2018)
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G.
&. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d
560 (6th Cir. 2018)
Penn v. New York Methodist Hosp., 884 F.3d
416 (2d Cir. 2018)
Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2018)
New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of United States, No.
16-4345, 2018 WL 2410806 (6th Cir. May 29,
2018)
Mayle v. United States, No. 17-3221, 2018 WL
2437325 (7th Cir. May 31, 2018)
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APPENDIX B
“To the Person” Cases in Federal Courts After O Centro
Last updated June 13, 2018
Case Name
Sample v. Lappin, 424 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006)
Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
Sample v. Lappin, 479 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2007)
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007)
United States v. Adeyemo, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D.
Cal. 2008)
United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.
2008)
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Conn. 2010)
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011)
United States v. Lafley, 656 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011)
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012)
Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d
106 (D.D.C. 2012)
Monaghan v. Sebelius, 916 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Mich.
2012)
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 402 (W.D. Pa.
2013)
Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Mich.
2013)
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 941 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Pa.
2013)
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Pa.
2013)
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Beckwith Elec. Co. v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D.
Fla. 2013)
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th
Cir. 2013)
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013)
Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013)
Zubik v. Sebelius, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius, 987 F.
Supp. 2d 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
Legatus v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Mich. 2013)
Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. v. Sebelius, 988 F.
Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Ind. 2013)
E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 743
(S.D. Tex. 2013)
Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius, 10 F. Supp. 3d
725 (E.D. Tex. 2014)
Ave Maria Found. v. Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d 957 (E.D.
Mich. 2014)
Dobson v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (D. Colo. 2014)
Colorado Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1052
(D. Colo. 2014)
Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Burwell, 28 F. Supp. 3d 944
(E.D. Mo. 2014)
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
Louisiana Coll. v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 766 (W.D. La.
2014)
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465
(5th Cir. 2014)
Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d
1269 (W.D. Okla. 2014)
Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015)
Sch. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (W.D. Mo. 2015)
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo.
2015)

TTP w/ CI
Only
TTP w/ CI
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& LRM
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& LRM
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Only
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& LRM
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& LRM
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Only
TTP w/ CI
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United States v. Epstein, 91 F. Supp. 3d 573 (D.N.J. 2015)
Singh v. McHugh, 109 F. Supp. 3d 72 (D.D.C. 2015)
Mar. for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C.
2015)
Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015)
Armstrong v. Jewell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 242 (D.R.I. 2015)
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419
(M.D. Pa. 2015)
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419
(M.D. Pa. 2015)
United States v. Girod, 159 F. Supp. 3d 773 (E.D. Ky.
2015)
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122 (11th Cir.
2016)
Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016)
United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016)
Wieland v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
196 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (E.D. Mo. 2016)
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D.
Mich. 2016)
Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D.
Tex. 2016)
United States v. Anderson, 854 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2017)
Ghailani v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2017)
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Duke,
286 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (D.N.M. 2017)
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